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interest.26  For that purpose, the general rule is applicable with
imputation of activities of an agent to the principal.
Wherever there is no statutory or regulatory provision routing
the question of involvement through Section 1402 of the
Internal Revenue Code, the general rule applies.27
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 41.06 (1999).
2 Pub. L. 94-455, Sec. 2004(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1862 (1976),
enacting I.R.C. § 6166.
3 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, Sec. 2003(e), 90
Stat. 1520, 1856 (1976), adding I.R.C. § 2032A.
4 Pub. L. 105-34, Sec. 105(a), 111 Stat. 788, 847 (1997),
enacting I.R.C. § 2033A.  See Harl, “The Family-Owned
Business Exclusion: In Need of Repairs,” 76 Tax Notes 1219
(1997).
5 Pub. L. 105-206, Sec. 6007(b), 112 Stat. 685, 807 (1998).
6 See Harl, supra n. 1.
7 See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 8133015, April 25, 1981 (installment
payment of federal estate tax).
8 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1) (rent as self-employment income).
9 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(b)(2)(ii).
10 25 T.C. 55 (1955), acq. 1960-2 C.B. 7, aff’d, 240 F.2d 164
(2d Cir. 1957).
11 Id.
12 I.R.C. §§ 541-547.
13 25 T.C. 55 (1955).
14 25 T.C. 55 (1955).
15 240 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1957).
16 See the 1960 acquiescence of IRS in the case of Webster
Corp. v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 55 (1955), acq., 1960-2 C.B. 7.
17 Pub. L. 93-368, Sec. 10(b), 88 Stat. 420 (1974).
18 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
19 Id.
20 Cong. Rec. 26082, July 31, 1974 (House).
21 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, Sec. 501(a), 100
Stat. 2233, 2237 (1986).
22 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(b)(2)(ii).
23 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
24 Se  I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
25 I.R.C. §§ 2057(b)(1)(D)(ii), 2057(f)(1)(A).
26 See I.R.C. §§ 2057(e)(1), 2057(e)(2), 543(a), 954(c)(1).
27 See 5 Harl, supra n. 1, § 41.06.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
CAMPER. The debtor claimed a pop-up camper as an exempt
household good under Me. Rev. Stat. § 422. The court applied a
functional nexus test that required eligible household goods to
contribute to the daily use, maintenance or upkeep of the
debtor’s household. Under that test, the court held that the
camper did not qualify as an exempt household good. In re
Schreiber, 231 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999).
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The debtor claimed an
exemption under La. Rev. Stat. § 46:111 for an income tax
refund resulting from earned income tax credit. The state
exemption included “all assistance” which was defined as
“money payments under” the state public welfare and
assistance programs. The court held that the EIC was not
eligible for the exemption because the EIC was not a money
payment under the state public welfare and assistance
programs. In re Collins, 170 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1999).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor filed for bankruptcy in California
where the debtor had been residing for the greater portion of the
pre-petition 180 days. The debtor claimed an exemption for a
homestead located in Michigan under the California homestead
exemption. The court held that the California exemption could
apply to a residence located in another state because the intent
of the state exemption was to provide a place for the debtor and
family to reside. In re Arrol, 170 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1999),
aff’g unrep. D. Ct. op. aff’g, 207 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Calif.
1997).
   CHAPTER 12    -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL. The debtor filed for Chapter 12 hours before
the commencement of an unlawful detainer action against the
debtor and the debtor’s mother. The debtor’s mother’s farm had
b en sold at foreclosure and the unlawful detainer action was
filed to force the debtor and mother to vacate the property. The
ebt r had few assets, only a small amount of debt and no
income. The plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action filed a
motion o convert the case to Chapter 7 for fraud because the
debtor was not a family farmer and failed to list assets on the
schedules. The court held that the failure to list several assets
was not sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent; however, the
court dismissed the case for bad faith because the debtor’s only
reason for the bankruptcy filing was to block the unlawful
detainer trial. The debtor was also required to pay the plaintiff’s
attorney fees associated with the bankruptcy case motions and
the delay in the state action trial, and the debtor was enjoined
from filing any bankruptcy petition for 180 days. In re Massie,
231 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
TAX LIEN. The debtors had transferred their residence to
their minor son in trust. However, no gift tax or trust returns
were ever filed, the debtors claimed all deductions associated
with th  residence, the debtors paid all expenses associated with
the residence, and the debtors claimed individual ownership of
the resid ce on loan applications and tax returns. The court
held that, although the trust was legitimate under state law
because it was established well before any of the bankruptcy
claims, including the tax claims, arose, the debtor’s actions
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demonstrated that the debtors continued to hold equitable title
to the residence such that the residence was subject to federal
tax liens for taxes owed by the debtors. In re Richards, 231
B.R. 571 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
CONTRACTS
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS . Iowa has enacted new
legislation which prohibits a contractor from enforcing a
passage in a production contract specifying confidentiality. The
confidentiality provision is void, even if stated in a separate oral
or written contract. In addition, a contractor executing a
production contract with a confidentiality provision is guilty of
a fraudulent practice. The provision applies to production
contracts for the production of a commodity owned by an
“active contractor” and produced by a “contract producer” at
the contract producer’s contract operation if (1) the contract is
executed by an active contractor and a contract producer of a
commodity; (2) the contract is executed by an active contractor
and a passive contractor for the provision of management
services to the contract producer in the production of the
commodity, or (3) the contract is executed by a passive
contractor and a contract producer if (a) the contract provides
for management services furnished by the passive contractor to
the contract producer in the production of the commodity and
(b) the passive contractor has a contractual relationship with the
active contractor involving the production of the commodity.
H.F. 322 (May 24, 1999).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations providing for a Group Risk Plan of Insurance for
2000 and later years. The plan provides insurance against the
widespread loss of barley, corn, cotton, forage, sorghum,
peanuts, soybeans, and wheat crops in a county. The GRP pays
only when the average yield of the entire county drops below
the expected county yield as determined by FCIC. The payment
is determined on the basis of the difference between the
expected area yield and the actual average yield for the whole
designated area. Thus, an insured can have no loss yet receive
payments if the area wide losses reduce the area yield to a
below-expected level and an insured may experience a loss and
yet receive no payment because the average yield for the area
was higher or as high as the expected average yield. 64 Fed.
Reg. 30214 (June 7, 1999), adding 7 CFR Part 407.
KARNAL BUNT . The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations that amend the Karnal Bunt regulations by
modifying the criteria for classifying regulated areas and by
modifying the classification of restricted areas. The rules
require that a bunted wheat kernel be found in or associated
with a field within an area before that area would be designated
as a regulated area. The rules also establish separate restricted
areas for seed and for regulated articles other than seed. The
APHIS found that tests currently available for use in identifying
spores did not allow differentiation between small numbers of
Karnal Bunt spores and the spores of an as yet unnamed, but
w dely distributed, ryegrass smut. The rules have the effect of
removing some areas in Arizona and California from the list of
regulated areas and relieving restrictions on the movement of
grain and other regulated articles from additional areas in
Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. 64 Fed. Reg.
29451 (June 2, 1999).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMER . The decedent’s spouse died two years before
the decedent. The couple had executed identical wills which
bequeathed a fixed sum to their child and the remainder to the
surviving spouse. The wills also established testamentary
residuary trusts which would receive any property disclaimed
by the surviving spouse. The couple had intended to allow some
post-death estate planning by the survivor to minimize the
estate tax over the death of the couple. The decedent had made
a good deal of preparation for the disclaimer of the spouse’s
estate which passed to the decedent but had only managed to
write down a list of the spouse’s assets before the decedent
died. The decedent’s estate argued that the decedent had
substantially complied with the disclaimer requirements
because the list was intended to be used for the disclaimer. The
court held that the list was not sufficient to be a qualified
disclaimer because the list contained no language of an
affirmative statement of disclaimer. The court noted that even
the list did not fully comply with the estate’s claim of the
decedent’s intent because the list did not contain enough assets
to fully minimize the estate tax. Estate of Chamberlain v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-181.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS . The
taxpayer established an irrevocable trust. The trustee was
required to distribute to the IRS or any similar state agency trust
income or principal to satisfy the taxpayer's income tax liability
attributable to trust. The amount of the distribution was equal to
the excess of taxpayer's personal income tax liability over
taxpayer's personal income tax liability computed as if taxpayer
was not the owner of any portion of the trust. Because the
distributions on taxpayer's behalf represented tax payments
allocable to the trust, the IRS ruled that the distributions did not
constitute the retention of the right to income as described in
I.R.C. § 2036(a). Therefore, the IRS concluded that the
requirement that the trustees make the specified distributions
would not cause trust corpus to be included in the taxpayer's
gross estate under Section 2036. The IRS noted that the
taxpayer would have retained an income interest for purposes of
Section 2036(a) if the trustee were required to make
distributions to reimburse the taxpayer for any tax liability not
attributable to the trust (e.g., income tax on personal salary or




ASSESSMENT. The taxpayer owed taxes from 1989. The
taxpayer filed for bankruptcy in July 1993, filed the 1989 return
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in April 1994 and received a bankruptcy discharge in April
1997. The court held that the limitation period for assessment of
the 1989 taxes was extended by 60 days after the discharge in
bankruptcy plus three years; therefore, the IRS assessment for
the 1989 taxes in December 1997 was timely. Provost v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-178.
BAD DEBT. The taxpayer was a construction corporation
owned entirely by a husband and wife. The taxpayer advanced
funds to the couple’s son who was an experienced construction
superintendent. Although no written records were kept for the
early advances, the taxpayer eventually carried the advances as
loans on its books, financial documents and tax records.
Promissory notes were written but carried no repayment
schedules or collateral. The notes stated that repayment would
be made from the son’s employment compensation but did not
make the loans contingent upon the son’s ability to repay.  The
son did make some repayments. The taxpayer made a resolution
in 1992 that the advances had no hope of being repaid and
wrote off the amount due as a bad debt and claimed a bad debt
deduction. In 1992 the son was unemployed and insolvent but
the son did not declare bankruptcy. The court held that the
advances were bona fide loans and were not contingent as to the
son’s liability for repayment. The court also held that the
determination that the loans were worthless in 1992 was
reasonable under the circumstances and allowed a business bad
debt deduction for 1992. Mann Const. Co. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-183.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The IRS has reminded tax
exempt organizations that they must either provide requesters
with copies of their approved exemption applications and their
three most recent annual information returns, or make the
information available on a website. Under previous rules, the
organizations did not have to provide copies as long as they
made the documents available for public inspection.
Reasonable copying fees and postage costs may be charged.
Penalties also apply to failures to comply with the new
disclosure requirements. A n. 99-62, I.R.B. 1999-__.
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT . The taxpayer was convicted
of selling government secrets to the former Soviet Union. The
taxpayer had received notice from the Soviets that $2 million
was set aside for payment for receipt of these documents but
funds were not given to the taxpayer until later tax years. The
taxpayer argued that the $2 million was constructively received
in 1985 but the IRS argued that the income was not taxable
until actually received. The court held that the income was not
constructively received in 1985 because the taxpayer had no
enforceable right to the money until it was received. Ames v.
Comm’r, 112 T.C. No. 20 (1999).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer
had a casualty loss from a natural disaster and submitted a
claim to an insurance company for the loss. The company
refused to pay the claim and the taxpayer sued for actual and
punitive damages. The taxpayer received a judgment for actual
and punitive damages and the judgment was appealed over
several years all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. After the
final appeal, in the first tax year, the state court clerk issued an
assessment for the judgment and added mandatory post-
judgment interest. The insurance company refused to pay the
interest and sought a ruling from the state court which stated
that it had no jurisdiction over a mandatory law. The insurance
company finally paid the post-judgment interest in the
followi g tax year. The taxpayer argued that the post-judgment
interest was included in income in the second tax year because
the fi al judgment was not reached until that year and the
amount of the payment was not known until the second tax
year. The IRS ruled that the payment was included in the first
tax year because the post-judgment interest was mandatory and
the rate of interest was set by law. Ltr. Rul. 9922056, Jan. 25,
1999.
DEPRECIATION . The taxpayer purchased a used
utomobile engine for the purpose of testing modifications with
th  intent of purchasing, modifying and selling other similar
engines. The taxpayer claimed the expense of the engine
purchase and modification costs as research and
experimen ation expenses. The IRS argued that the engine and
modification costs were only depreciable. The court held that
the determination of a depreciable assets depended upon the
nature of the asset and not the use of the asset. Because the
engine was capable of lasting several years, and in fact did last
se ral years, the engine was a depreciable asset. Ekm n v.
Comm’r, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,580 (6th Cir.
1999).
In a field service memorandum, the IRS discussed the
position that examiners should take in light of the Tax Court's
decision in Health Corp. of America, Inc. v. Comm’r, 109 T.C.
21 (1997). The IRS reviewed the factors relevant to a
determination of whether an item is a structural component of a
building or tangible personal property, as well as what facts and
circum ances may be of special concern to examiners. The IRS
advised that the determination is still a highly factual one, with
no bright line tests. Under the regulations, the term “structural
components” includes such parts of a building as walls,
partitions, floors, and ceilings, as well as any permanent
coverings therefor such as paneling or tiling; windows and
doors; all components (whether in, on, or adjacent to the
building) of a central air conditioning or heating system,
including motors, compressors, pipes and ducts; plumbing and
plumbing fixtures; such as sinks and bathtubs; electric wiring
and lighting fixtures; chimneys; stairs; escalators, and elevators,
including all components thereof; sprinkler systems; fire
escapes; and other components relating to the operation or
maintenance of a building. . .. The IRS noted that the term
“structural components” does not include machinery installed
solely for meeting temperature or humidity requirements which
are essential for the operation of other machinery or the
processi g of materials or foodstuffs. The IRS stated that the
Health Corp. court summarized the regulation saying, “an item
constitutes a structural component of a building if the item
relates to the operation and maintenance of the building. . . .”
109 T.C. at 58. The IRS warned that the list may be misleading
in that the Health Corp. court followed Scott Paper Co. v.
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 137 (1980) in determining that even though
wiring is an example under Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2), it is not
a structural component unless it relates to the operation or
maintenance of a building. The focus, the court found, should
be on ultimate use. The IRS has stated that it will not challenge
the Scott Paper approach. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1983-469, action on decision, 1991-19 (Oct. 22,
1991). Thus, the determination of whether an asset is a
structural component or tangible personal property is a facts
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and circumstances assessment. The IRS stated that pre- 1981
case law and factors set forth therein are still relevant to the
assessment. L r. Rul. 9921045, April 1, 1999.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was a
partnership which had S corporations as partners. The taxpayer
had discharge of indebtedness income and the issue was the
level at which the insolvency exception of I.R.C. § 108 applied.
As to the taxpayer, the partnership, the IRS ruled that, under
I.R.C. § 108(d)(6), the insolvency exception was to be applied
at the partner level. Because the partners were S corporations,
the insolvency exception was, under I.R.C. § 108(d)(7), to be
applied at the corporate level and not at the shareholder level.
FSA 9999-9999-215 (no date given).
EARNED INCOME CREDIT . The taxpayer was a member
of the armed services and received quarters and subsistence
allowance during the tax year involved. The taxpayer excluded
the quarters and subsistence allowance from earned income for
purposes of the earned income tax credit. The court held that,
under 37 U.S.C. § 101(25), quarters and subsistence allowance
was included in the definition of regular military compensation;
therefore, the quarters and subsistence allowance was
compensation to the taxpayer and included in earned income for
purposes of the earned income tax credit. Neff v. United
States, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,571 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
INTEREST . The taxpayers were assessed a deficiency and
interest assessment after an audit of their personal and business
returns. The taxpayers made the interest payments and claimed
an interest deduction but the IRS disallowed the deduction
under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A) which
characterizes all interest on personal tax deficiencies as
personal interest which is not eligible for a deduction. The
taxpayers argued that the regulation was invalid, citing the
District Court decision in M ller v. United States. The court
followed the appellate decisions in Miller v. U.S., 65 F.3d 687
(8th Cir. 1995) and Redlark v. Comm'r, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,322 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’g,  106 T.C. 31 (1996) in
holding the regulation to be valid. See also Harl, “Is Interest on
Taxes Deductible?” 7 Agric. L. Dig. 33 (1996). McDonnell v.
United States, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) (6th Cir. 1999).
INTEREST RATE .  The IRS has announced that, for the
period July 1, 1999 through September 30, 1999, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent (7 percent in the case
of a corporation) and for underpayments is 8 percent. The
interest rate for underpayments by large corporations is 10
percent. The overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate
overpayment exceeding $10,000 is 5.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 99-
27, I.R.B. 1999-__, __.
LOSSES. The taxpayers were the heirs of an Iranian general
whose lands were confiscated by the Iranian government. The
taxpayers claimed a loss from the confiscation. The
confiscation began prior to the general’s death and became final
after the general’s death. The taxpayers claimed the loss when
the confiscation became final. First, the court held that
confiscation did not qualify as a casualty or theft loss. Second,
the court held that the taxpayers inherited only a nominal
interest in the land because the general was deprived of the
benefits of ownership prior to death. Thus, the court held that
the property was not trade or business property when
confiscated and was not entitled to a loss deduction. The
o inion is designated as not for publication. Gouhari v. United
Sta es, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,583 (4th Cir. 1999).
MEDICAL DEDUCTION . The IRS has announced that the
cost of smoking-cessation programs and prescription drugs for
nicotine withdrawal are eligible for the medical deduction. The
IRS, how ver, stated that the costs of over-the-counter
medications, such as non-prescription nicotine patches are not
deductible. Rev. Rul. 99-28, I.R.B. 1999-25.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.02[3][c].*
DEFINITION. The taxpayer was a company which entered
into management service agreements with unrelated service
companies. The taxpayer purchased real and personal property
under these agreements and provided property and business
management services for the clients. The taxpayer was
prevented by law from operating the clients’ businesses;
therefore, the business services were limited to administrative
services. Under the service agreements the taxpayer and each
client formed a policy board which was responsible for
decisions on capital improvements and expansions, annual
budgets, advertising and other administrative type decisions.
The policy board coordinated the services that the taxpayer
provided and managed the contractual relationship between a
client and the taxpayer, but did not control or coordinate the
provision of the client’s business services. The IRS ruled that
the greements did not create a partnership between the
taxpayer and the clients. Ltr. Rul. 9922014, Feb. 12, 1999.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayer was a
single-member LLC. The LLC did not elect, under the “check-
the-box” regulations to be taxed as an association. The IRS
ruled that the general rule that members of LLCs are not
personally liable for employment taxes incurred by the LLC
does not apply to single-member LLCs unless the LLC elects
association (corporation) status under the “check-the-box”
regulations because, absent such election, the LLC entity is
disregarded for federal tax purposes. Thus, the IRS ruled that
the single member is the statutory employer and is liable for
employment tax incurred by the LLC. Ltr. Rul. 9922053, April
16, 1999.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The taxpayer was an
S corporation which had a shareholder who was the chair of the
board of directors, and an officer but was not the tax matters
person. The issue was whether that shareholder had the
authority to extend the period of limitations for making
assessments with respect to all the shareholders pursuant to
I.R.C. § 6229(b)(1)(B). In a 1992 field service advice
memorandum, the IRS ruled that the extension was binding on
the other shareholders because the signing shareholder had the
authority to execute such extension agreements. FSA 1992-
1120-1,  Nov. 20, 1992.
INTEREST. The taxpayer was a shareholder in an S
corporation and had personally guaranteed corporate debt on
real property owned by the corporation. The corporation was
unable to pay the loans on the properties and the taxpayer made
the payments and claimed a deduction for the mortgage interest
paid. The taxpayer argued that the interest was paid under the
personal guarantee of the corporate loans. The court held that
the interest was not deductible by the taxpayer because the
taxpayer did not have a fixed, noncontingent, legal obligation to
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pay the interest and that reimbursement from the corporation
was barred by bankruptcy. Provost v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-178.
SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION EXPENSES . The
taxpayer was a foreign partnership required to file U.S. federal
income tax returns. The partnership owned and operated farms
in Australia and had soil and water conservation expenses on
the farms. The partnership was allowed to deduct, under I.R.C.
§ 175, these expenses incurred before December 31, 1986. The
IRS argued that Section 175, as modified by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 401(a), 100 Stat. 2221, which
added section 175(c)(3), no longer applied to conservation
expenditures incurred with respect to land located outside the
United States. The court agreed and disallowed the deduction
for land located in Australia. Koramba Farmers & Graziers
No. 1 v. Comm’r, 99-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,579 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), aff’g, 110 T.C. 445 (1998).
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The taxpayer moved to Nashville,
Tenn. because the taxpayer’s spouse obtained employment
there. The taxpayer, however, could not find employment in
Nashville and traveled to Las Vegas to gamble and seek
employment. The taxpayer did not find employment in Las
Vegas but found employment in El Paso, Texas. The taxpayer
moved to El Paso and lived there for two years while the spouse
remained in Nashville. The court held that the taxpayer could
not deduct job hunting travel expenses in Nashville, could not
deduct more than one-fourth of the job hunting expenses in Las
Vegas, and could not deduct the living expenses in El Paso
because the employment in El Paso was not shown to have been
temporary. Lyle v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-184.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
PESTICIDE . The plaintiff had purchased a registered
insecticide manufactured by the defendant for the control of
weevils in a purple hull pea crop. The plaintiff sued for
damages to the crop, based on the insecticide’s failure to
control the weevils. The defendant argued that the action was
preempted by FIFRA. The plaintiff argued that preemption did
not apply because the purpose of FIFRA was to govern the
safety of registered pesticides and the plaintiff’s action applied
only to the efficacy of the product as claimed by the defendant.
The court held that FIFRA preempted all causes of action based
upon the labeling of the product. The plaintiff also alleged that
the defendant’s employees made oral misrepresentations as to
the ability of the product to control weevils. The court found
that one of the alleged representations was a restatement of the
information on the product label and was, therefore, preempted
by FIFRA. However, the other alleged misrepresentation,
which compared the defendant’s product with other products,
included statements not found on the labels and was, therefore,
not preempted by FIFRA. M & H Enterprises v. Tri-state,
984 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CROP INSURANCE PROCEEDS. The debtor had granted
a security interest in all crops and “the products and proceeds
thereof.” The creditor properly perfected the security interest.
The debtor obtained federal crop insurance on a cotton crop.
The insurance policy allowed the debtor to assign the insurance
proceeds but the creditor did not require the assignment. The
debtor received insurance proceeds for a cotton crop covered by
the security interest but did not pay the proceeds on the secured
debt. The bankruptcy court held that the creditor’s lien was not
valid as to the crop insurance proceeds because the creditor
failed to take an assignment of the proceeds. The court held that
the federal crop insurance requirement preempted any state
secured transaction law on the issue. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the federal crop insurance law involved
only claims between the creditor and the FCIC. Once the
proceeds were paid to the debtor, state secured transactions law
applied as between the creditor and the debtor. The court
further held that crop insurance payments were proceeds of the
crop and covered by the security interest granted to the creditor.
In re Cook, 169 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1999).
FEEDLOT LIEN . Iowa has amended its cattle feedlot lien to
give the holder of a custom cattle feedlot lien priority over a
conflicting lien or security interest in the cattle, including a lien
or security interest perfected prior to the creation of the feedlot
lien. Iowa has also adopted a provision which makes any
waiver of a right to file a custom cattle feedlot lien void and
un nforceable. H.F. 322 (May 24, 1999).
PRODUCER LIEN . Iowa has enacted a new producer’s lien
in favor of a producer under a production contract for the
production of a commodity owned by the contractor. The lien
covers the amount owed to the producer under the terms of the
production contract. If the commodity is livestock which are
not sold or slaughtered by the contractor, the lien is on the
livestock. if the livestock are sold by the contractor, the lien is
on the cash proceeds of the sale. If the livestock are slaughtered
by the contractor, the lien is on “any property of the contractor
that may be subject to a security interest.” If the commodity is
raw milk which is not sold or processed by the contractor, the
lien is on the milk. If the raw milk is sold by the contractor, the
lien is on the cash proceeds of the sale. If the milk is processed
by the contractor, the lien is on “any property of the contractor
that may be subject to a security interest.” If the commodity is a
crop w ich is not sold or processed by the contractor, the lien is
on the crop. If the crop is sold by the contractor, the lien is on
th  cash proceeds of the sale. If the crop is processed by the
c tractor, the lien is on “any property of the contractor that
may be subject to a security interest.” The lien is created when
the commodity arrives at the contract facility and continues for
one year after the commodity leaves the authority of the
contract producer. To preserve the lien, a contractor must file a
lien statement in the office of the Secretary of State. In general,
the lie  must be filed within 45 days after the livestock or raw
milk arrive at the contract facility or the crop is planted. As
noted above under Feedlot Lien, a waiver of the right to claim a
lien is not enforceable. H.F. 322 (May 24, 1999).
CITATION UPDATES
Plante v. Comm’r, 168 F.3d 1279(11th Cir. 1999), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1997-386 (bad debt) see p. 46 supra.
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The Agricultural Law Press and the Montana Society of CPAs present
“SEMINAR IN THE ROCKIES”
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 4-6, 1999 Rock Creek Resort, Red Lodge Montana
Come join us in the clear, wild mountain air of the Montana Rocky Mountains for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in
agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for this wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the
splendor of one of America’s greatest natural wonders.
The seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, August 4-6, 1999 at the Rock Creek Lodge, near Red Lodge located in
the heart of the magnificent Montana Rockies. Registrants may attend one, two or all three days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl and Roger McEowen
will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in all other areas of
agricultural law. Your registration fee includes a copy of Dr. Neil Harl's seminar manuals, Farm Income Tax (almost 300 pages)
and Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials (nearly 500 pages) and a copy of Roger McEowen’s seminar
materials, all of which will be updated prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small
additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Special room discounts are available for all rooms at the Rock Creek Resort. The resort is located 60 miles south of Logan
International Airport in Billings, MT and 60 miles north of Yellowstone Regional Airport in Cody, WY.
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles
of Agricultural Law and members of the MSCPAs are $175 (one day), $350 (two days) and $500 (three days).  The registration
fees for nonsubscribers and nonmembers are $195, $380 and $560 respectively.
*       *       *       *
The Agricultural Law Press presents the 4th Annual “Seminar In Paradise”
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING SEMINAR
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 24-28, 2000 Royal Lahaina Resort, Island of Maui, Hawai’i
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 2000! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and the rest of
paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A.
McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 24-28, 2000 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Lahaina Resort on the Island of
Maui, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast and break
refreshments included in the registration fee. That is 20 hours of practical instruction in the most important areas of agricultural
estate and business planning.   Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 500 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and
Business Planning: Annotated Materials, which will be updated just prior to the seminar. A CD-ROM version will also be
available for a small additional charge.
Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal Lahaina Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricul ural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 or e-mail: aglaw@aol.com, if you need a brochure for either seminar.
Also, see our web site for details and registration forms:
http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
